demnation of land for the Kinzua Dam backwater is less important now than the need for congressional funds to assure the new housing before their homes are flooded.

"Our housing program is ready, but we can't move on it without funds," Mr. Heron said. "If we don't have our new homes before the deadline for moving, I will have to advise the people to remain where they are.

"You might say," he remarked, "that we are thinking about getting angry over all this."

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1964]

INJURY UPON INJUSTICE

A probability of adding serious injury to injustice arises from the delay in passing H.R. 1794 to finance the relocation and rehabilitation of the Seneca Indians who will be deprived of their homes by the Kinzua Dam. Construction of the dam near the Pennsylvania-New York border was begun in disregard of a 1794 treaty guaranteeing to the Seneca Nation "free use and enjoyment" of the area forever. President Kennedy concluded in 1961 that it was not possible to halt the Kinzua project, but he pledged to the anguished Indians full cooperation of the Federal Government to help them "make the adjustment as fair and orderly as possible." Now, however, flooding of the Seneca lands is said to be less than 8 months away and funds have not been provided to build new homes, churches, schools, and roads on the remaining land.

The House unanimously passed H.R. 1794 2 weeks ago, and Senate hearings are scheduled for March 2. No opposition to the bill has arisen, but it is feared that it will be caught in the Senate filibuster over civil rights and indefinitely delayed. If that should happen, flooding from the dam may drive the Indians out of their homes before it is possible to carry out an orderly relocation.

If it is impossible to speed up the Senate hearing, Chairman FRANK CHURCH, of the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, should make certain that it is held on March 2, in spite of any filibuster, and that the bill is promptly reported to the Senate. The importance of the bill would then justify special efforts to have it pass the Senate by unanimous consent. To leave this harassed minority without relief as manmade floodwaters encroach upon it would be a reproach to the whole country.

VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, a few days ago I had a discussion on the floor of the Senate with the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] about Vietnam. It dealt with his suggestion that we give consideration to President de Gaulle's ideas for the neutralization of Vietnam.

This morning we find widespread speculation in the press, most prominently displayed. Today, Asia probably bulks largets in the news of any area in the world. It is a question as to the support which the United States would give to alternative courses of action, first, to the extension of the struggle by South Vietnam to North Vietnam; second, the possible espousal of De Gaulle's neutralist ideas; third, to stay where we are now.

The news carried in the newspapers is also clear that the existing regime in South Vietnam is very much concerned about its own position. The head of that regime, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, is concerned because he believes that there is a French plan to kill him, according to the lead story in the New York Times.

I believe it is clear, on the basis of the national consensus as it is reflected over the weekend, and by what I and other Senators have said and by what other Americans have said, that we are in Vietnam to stay, that we will do our utmost to give all the aid we can to South Vietnam, that we will do our utmost to bring about a stable democratic government in South Vietnam; that we are not getting out of South Vietnam, and that we are not adopting the De Gaulle ideas of neutralization; also, that there is no idea at present of extending the struggle to North Vietnam. In other words, we intend to hold our ground and to implement our position, considering where we are.

I thoroughly agree with that view, and I believe the Nation does also. It calls for action on the part of the President and the State Department.

I take the floor today because in this critically important situation in which we find ourselves, I believe that the President should make a considered statement to the American people, declaring American policy on South Vietnam. I also believe that this statement should be supported by a white paper issued by the State Department, explaining the position of the United States in respect to our policy in South Vietnaf, why we are there, and what we intend to do.

I believe both of these actions are necessary, to give a sense of permanence and stability to the situation in which we find ourselves today. It does not mean that we will undertake greater commitments than we have, or threaten to do something which we have no intention of doing, or refrain from threatening to do anything. It does mean that it is essential that the American people have peace of mind about South Vietnam, that what they are doing is right, that they have determined, as a nation, to do it, and that this is the policy which the President and the State Department should carry out.

This is critically important. The Chinese situation is none too good as it relates to India. The struggle between Communist China and Communist Russia continues. In short, in this unstable situation there is the real element of the policy of the United States, which should be declared in an unequivocal way. Finally, the whole southeast Asia area depends on South Vietnam as the keystone in the arch.

The character of our position there may well determine whether Communist China will or will not sweep through all Asia. This would change the balance in the world and put us in the gravest jeopardy. So I hope very much that the President and the State Department will at the earliest moment make secure the one secure element in the whole South Vietnamese situation, namely the home base in the United States. It is the determination of the American people that they would rather take casualties and losses than inestimably greater ones which would become inevitable if the whole free world position, in south and southeast Asia were eroded, as it would be if we were to pull out of Vietnam.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am sorry that I did not hear the beginning of the remarks made by the distinguished Senator from New York. I was informed that he referred to the colloquy which the Senator from New York had with the Senator from Montana in the Senate last week.

So far as Vietnam is concerned, there are some factors which we ought to keep in mind, and I believe the RECORD ought to be kept straight. Our purpose in Vietnam, as I see it, is to assist the Vietnamese to maintain the territorial integrity based on the 1954 Geneva Accord, which means that the frontier established at the 17th parallel will continue to be recognized, and that we will contribute in the future, as we have in the past, to the protection of that territorial integrity and the stabilization and security of he country.

To accomplish this will mean a continuation of our present participation, both economic and military, and a continued policy of strengthening the South Vietnamese forces so that they can continue the war; put down the Vietcong elements within the country, and do what they can to stop the inflow of the Vietminh along the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and Cambodia on the west and the sea transport on the east.

It has been said by the highest officials in the past two administrations, and in this administration, that this is primarily a Vietnamese war, and that if it is to be won it must be won by the Vietnamese themselves. There have also been indications by high officials in this and the preceding administration that this war could be brought to a successful conclusion as far as we are concerned in anywhere from 1 to 3 to 5 years. Also, statements have been made to the effect that American troops would be withdrawn by tentatively determined dates.

Having described what our purpose is in Vietnam, the next question is: What will be the result when and if the objectives desired are achieved? The result will be that Vietnam to which we are not tied, under a mutual security agreement, and which comes under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO—only incidentally and through association—would then be in complete charge of its own future. It would, I assume, be friendly oriented toward the United States, but in the absence of definite security treaty arrangements, it would be classified as a neutral nation, a neutralization not in favor of Communist North Vietnam, not in favor of Communist China, but in favor of, and for the protection of, South Vietnam itself.

Its problem then, as now, would be to establish some sort of mutually acceptable agreement covering its western frontier with Cambodia. Perhaps the same border situation would apply to Laos, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no indication that such is the case at the present time.

This, in brief, in my opinion, sums up our reasons for being in Vietnam and

for staying in Vietnam. Stating what our objectives are emphasizes that our contribution can best be only on the periphery, and that basically and primarily the solution must be sought by the Vietnamese themselves. That solution involves not only a military victory over the Vietcong in South Vietnam, but stopping the flow of arms from North Vietnam, the rectification of border difficulties with Cambodia and possibly Laos, and perhaps, most important of all, a government based on stability and support of the Vietnamese people.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that I may have 1 more minute.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. At the present time, according to the best information I have received—and I have a purpose in making this statement—this Government has indicated an interest in the four-power proposal advanced by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia, to the effect that a four-power conference should be convened for the purpose of guaranteeing the borders and the neutrality of Cambodia—those powers to be Thailand, South Vietnam, the United States, and Cambodia itself.

When people try to read into remarks which I have made that I have advocated that in any negotiations of this sort vis-a-vis South Vietnam, I have indicated that Communist China must be one of the participants, they are reading into my remarks something which is not there. I tried to make the RECORD clear in the colloquy I had with the senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the other day.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, in the first place, I am sorry the Senator from Montana did not hear what I said. I only referred to him as showing my continuity of interest in the area. I did not in any way try to go over the same ground again.

Mr. MANSFIELD. But it was the same subject.

Mr. JAVITS. It was the same subject. Second, I am certainly not one who has felt that the Senator from Montana has in any way involved the Communist Chinese among the negotiating parties. Perhaps others have, but I certainly have not, and I make no such assertion now, and would not dream of doing so. I was very clear as to the Senator's position.

Third, I am sure the Senator heard my recommendation—and I believe we are arriving at a national consensus—that it would be well to have that policy firmly established through a declaration by the President to the people, especially as we are suffering casualties in South Vietnam, the only place in the world where we are. It is really a hot conflict at the moment. The declaration should be supported by a white paper on the part of the State Department, giving the whole history of our relationship to this crisis.

Fourth, the Senator and I really do not differ quite so much, as we have gradually narrowed the ground of difference.

I am deeply concerned about a repetition of the difficulties we face in Cambodia and the Pathet Lao difficulties in Laos and South Vietnam, if we give the South Vietnamese the feeling that we are anxious to liquidate that situation at the earliest moment.

I would rather give them the feeling that we are willing to accept casualties, provided we remain true to the original mission we set for ourselves. There may be a little difference of timing, there may be a little difference in emphasis, but as we have gradually narrowed the grounds of difference, I think timing and emphasis are the points that stand out.

I fully respect what the Senator has said. No one honors him more than I for the fact that this subject has been thrust into the forefront of discussion. He and I agree that this could not be otherwise than helpful.

Finally, one of the major items to appear in the press this morning is the disarray of the NATO Alliance on this issue. It is reported that there is considerable dissension in NATO, which is all the more reason for taking advantage of a developing consensus in our Nation and nailing it down as to the fundamental basis of American policy and our willingness to take casualties and difficulties in order to persevere in that policy in South Vietnam.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the American people had better become fully aware of exactly what confronts us, in view of the possibilities in Vietnam. The truth will hurt no one. The truth should and must be told. If we go along on the basis of some policies which I have heard advocated, even in the Senate, and also in the press, the American people had better be made fully aware of the costs involved, not only in material and money, but in men, as well. And they had better think this through carefully. All we here can do is discuss this matter. The responsibility lies with the President of the United States. I think he has conducted himself in exemplary fashion. His understanding is sound, and his grip has been firm; and I only hope that when Mr. McNamara returns from Vietnam—and I, for one, am delighted that a man of his caliber is going there again—he will be able to give the President the benefit of his survey and inquiry, so that we shall be in a better position to determine where we are, and where we are going.

The Senator from New York has mentioned the fact that NATO is in disarray. Mr. President, NATO has been in disarray for years; CENTO has been in disarray; and SEATO has been in disarray. I think the best thing our country can do is reassess its foreign policy, insofar as it is possible to do so, face up to the realities of today, and not depend so much on the wishes of yesterday.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield again to me, very briefly?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe the American people will accept the risks in Vietnam, if we pursue our present policy. That is the fundamental point I am trying to make—that they are not unduly dissuaded from that by the desires on which both the Senator from Montana and I agree. I believe that when the issue is presented squarely—and it seems to me the Senator from Montana and I certainly agree on that—the American people will accept the risks and will back a continuance of the present policy, notwithstanding the risks, even including casualties.

UNITED STATES CHECKS LARD DEAL

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to commend the prompt action of President Johnson in blocking shipments of lard from the United States to Communist Cuba. By acting promptly, the President prevented a small hole in the dike of U.S. economic policy from becoming an even more disastrous breakthrough which would have given all of our European allies even more of an invitation to trade with Castro.

Mr. President, the incident shows that there is a pressing need for closer coordination of trade policies. Within the United States, and under the terms of the Export Control Act of 1949, there is adequate authority to regulate exports, to require licenses, and, if necessary, to refuse licenses in cases where trade would not be in the overall interests of the United States. Yet trade with Cuba has been treated in such an amorphous manner, without form or consistency, that it is technically possible for U.S. merchants to sell many types of food and medicine to Cuba, without any kind of license. Even though such sales would have great foreign policy effects, there is at present no requirement for licensing. The first step surely is for the United States to set its own house in order, and to require in the case of Cuba, as we do for Red China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, that export licenses be obtained for all shipments. In this way our Government could grant permission for items badly needed for humanitarian purposes, such as perhaps certain kinds of drugs in an emergency, but could refuse licenses in a case of this sort, where the motive is primarily profit and the impact would have been disastrous.

The second step in United States economic coordination of trade with Cuba, after we have set our own procedures in somewhat better order, is to press our allies more effectively for a coordinated policy on Cuban trade. The cutting off of aid, small as it was, might have been extremely effective, had it been done promptly after the missile crisis in 1962. It will obviously mean a good deal less today. We should plan for an international conference of all the major industrial nations involved, with a view to working out fair and reasonable procedures on the Cuba trade. We may have to make compromises of other kinds, to get their agreement on Cuba. We may, for instance, have to yield to British pleas to cut off United States aid to Indonesia—a course which many Americans would in any case favor; but we